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Experts’ and Novices’ Perception of
Ignorance and Knowledge in
Different Research Disciplines and
Its Relation to Belief in Certainty of
Knowledge
Isabelle Hansson*, Sandra Buratti and Carl Martin Allwood
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
Assessments of the extent of knowledge in a domain can be important since non-
identified lack of knowledge may lead to decisions that do not consider the effect of
relevant factors. Two studies examined experts’ and novices’ perception of their own
ignorance and knowledge out of everything there is to know within their own and other
disciplines and their assessments of their discipline’s, and other disciplines’ knowledge
of all there is to know in each discipline. In total 380 experts and 401 students from the
disciplines of history, medicine, physics, and psychology participated. The results for
ignorance and knowledge assessments of one’s own knowledge were similar. Novices
reported more ignorance and less knowledge in their own discipline than experts,
but no differences were found in the assessments of how much is known in each
discipline. General belief in certainty of knowledge was associated with the knowledge
assessments and level of expertise. Finally, disciplinary differences were found both for
the knowledge assessments and for belief in certainty of knowledge. Historians and
physicists assessed that less was known in their own discipline out of all there is to know
(approximately 40%), compared to the medics (about 50%). Historians believed least in
certainty of knowledge and physicists most. Our results have practical implications for
higher educational teaching and interdisciplinary collaboration.
Keywords: ignorance, knowledge assessments, experts, novices, belief in certainty of knowledge
INTRODUCTION
In order for people to make good judgments and decisions it is often important for them to consider
the extent of their own and others’ knowledge about the deliberated issue. Generally speaking, lack
of knowledge implies uncertainty in judgments and a risk that the decision made is wrong (Edwards
and Tversky, 1967), for example because the decision does not consider the effect of all relevant
factors. Previous research has studied people’s knowledge assessments in fairly limited contexts
(e.g., the extent of their knowledge in the area covered by a university test to be taken), but in real
life any factors that influence events may be relevant to consider, irrespective of if these factors
have been previously identified or not. It is therefore important to improve our understanding of
broader knowledge assessments relating to all there is to know in an area.
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To lack relevant knowledge without realizing it can
have disastrous consequences. Consider, for example, the
underestimation of the risk of a nuclear accident when
constructing the Fukushima power plant in Japan (e.g., Ravetz,
1993), the risk of doctors making premature decisions on the
basis of too limited information (Groopman, 2007), the risk of
juries prematurely reaching a “guilty” (or “non-guilty”) outcome,
or newspapers prematurely deciding to publish a news-story,
etc. Careful assessments of the extent of one’s own and other’s
knowledge may help hinder such events. Furthermore, given
humans’ general tendency to look for affirmative examples
(Nickerson, 1998) it can be important to consider lack of
knowledge within a certain area, although this may be less
common to do. In general, researchers’ knowledge tends to
be trusted and research tends to play an ever larger role in
the planning and development processes of society. Therefore
researchers’ assessments of lack of knowledge may be especially
pertinent to understand better. An example where this may be
relevant is decisions about allocation of research funding.
The present study explored how academic experts and novices
differ in their assessment of their own ignorance (Study 1) and of
their own knowledge (Study 2) in relation to everything there is to
know in a number of subareas in their own discipline, and these
ratings were compared to ratings of their own knowledge within
a number of subareas in four different scientific disciplines.
Furthermore, people often rely on the knowledge of others in
society and experts and novices may hold different conceptions
about their own knowledge within a field and of the state of
knowledge in the field as such. Therefore we also investigated
participants’ assessments of how much is known within the same
four disciplines as such in relation to everything there is to know.
Finally, in order to learn more about how knowledge assessments
relate to the assessor’s thinking style, we also investigated the
relationship between the participants’ epistemological belief in
certainty of knowledge and the knowledge assessments made by
the same university experts and novices.
Research has investigated people’s knowledge assessments in
different contexts. Some of this work concerns “don’t know”
judgments of specific knowledge items and has been carried out
in well confined task contexts in forensic research (e.g., Roebers
et al., 2007; Buratti et al., 2014) and in memory studies (e.g.,
Glucksberg and McCloskey, 1981).
Knowledge assessments have also been investigated in
research on accuracy of confidence judgments of one’s own and
other people’s knowledge (e.g., Johansson and Allwood, 2007).
Studies on confidence accuracy have in general shown that people
often tend to be overconfident in their knowledge assessments
although the reasons for this are contested (for reviews see
Allwood and Granhag, 1999; Griffin and Brenner, 2004). In
brief, this line of research shows the failure of both experts and
novices to recognize their own ignorance in many contexts. Some
research on confidence accuracy has also looked explicitly at
expert-novice differences (e.g., Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977;
Lambert et al., 2012), however, the studies show mixed result and
the differences found may depend on the knowledge domain.
Since studies regarding confidence accuracy for general
knowledge concern evaluations of one’s own and others’
knowledge, they have some relevance to the present study.
However, the results of the above mentioned studies usually
pertain to confidence in answers to specific questions or
confidence in memory of studied material. Thus, the knowledge
assessments studied within the confidence accuracy literature
differ from the broader knowledge assessments investigated in
the present study. In addition, importantly, the accuracy of the
performed knowledge assessments was not investigated in the
present study.
Other research has studied the usefulness of perceived
ignorance and has identified negative effects of knowledge (e.g.,
Son and Kornell, 2010; Fisher and Kail, 2016). For example, Son
and Kornell (2010) reviewed research in cognitive psychology
showing the advantages of recognized ignorance for individuals’
performance, for example with respect to the accuracy of their
confidence judgments, judgments of learning, hindsight bias
tendency, and learning (see also Smithson, 2015).
Within the fields of psychology of education and science
communication studies research has investigated judgments
concerning others’ knowledge (e.g., Scharrer et al., 2013, 2014;
Shtulman, 2013; Bromme and Thomm, 2016; Bromme et al.,
2016). Many such studies have investigated what is assumed to be
known in research as well, but none of these studies have looked
at the differences between experts and novices with respect to
their knowledge assessments of all there is to know in disciplinary
domains, which is the focus of the present study.
Finally, ignorance, in the sense described above, has been
studied mainly in philosophy (e.g., Rescher, 2009) but also in risk
research (e.g., Sjöberg, 2001). For example, several taxonomies
of types of ignorance have been presented by philosophers and
others (e.g., Smithson, 1989, 1993; Faber et al., 1992; Armour,
2000; Gross, 2007; Rescher, 2009; Croissant, 2014). In brief,
although the above studies have investigated different types
of judgments of perceived ignorance or knowledge, with the
exceptions of risk research and philosophy, none of them have
studied knowledge assessments of the broad kind examined in
the present study.
Assessments of the extent of knowledge may be influenced
by the judge’s conceptions of knowledge; that is, their epistemic
beliefs which are part of their epistemic cognition (Sinatra et al.,
2014). Such beliefs are both general and domain-specific (Hofer,
2006). Much research on epistemological beliefs, taking a general
approach, has concluded that younger persons in many contexts
may tend to view knowledge as something objective and absolute,
where “right” or “wrong” exists. Later in development, the same
research has identified a more subjective approach focused on
the influence of “the knower” and knowledge, as a consequence,
being seen as more uncertain. Further developments include
more complicated epistemological beliefs where an objective and
a subjective approach to knowledge are integrated at a more
mature level. Here, knowledge is seen as more tentative and
evolving and several different versions of the “truth” are possible
(Perry, 1970; Kuhn et al., 2000; Sinatra et al., 2014). Kuhn
et al. (2000) found that many of their adult participants had
not reached the last developmental stage where the subjectivity
of “the knower” is seen to mediate understanding of reality
but where, at the same time, critical thinking can be an aid to
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enhance understanding of reality. Other approaches to epistemic
cognition emphasize the context-bound and domain specific
nature of epistemological thinking (e.g., Elby and Hammer,
2001).
In order to study how ignorance and knowledge are perceived
we defined, on a general level, knowledge as true, justified belief,
thereby following a common definition in Western philosophical
tradition. True, justified belief means that, apart from truth,
also both conviction and satisfactory reasons are necessary for
the knowledge claim to be called knowledge. In this study, we,
more specifically, identified as knowledge such conceptions about
the world which at the present time are regarded as established
according to accepted scientific standards. These conceptions,
however, may be shown to be wrong in the future. With ignorance
we mean lack of knowledge in a broad sense, that is, in relation to
everything possible to know.
In this study we also tested a common idea, namely that
the more you know, the more you know you don’t know.
More specifically it has been argued that the more you know
about an area, the more you realize you do not know (e.g.,
Ravetz, 1987; Krohn, 2001; Gross, 2007; Rescher, 2009; Gross and
McGoey, 2015). For example, Gross (2007) suggested “whenever
new knowledge arises the perceived amount of non-knowledge
increases at least proportionally, since ‘every state of knowledge
opens up even more notions of what is not known’ (Krohn,
2001, p. 8141)” (p. 751). Thus, it is argued that new knowledge
gives a person more possibilities to identify new unknowns.
Following this line of thinking, experts should be more aware of
their ignorance than novices. However, we know of no empirical
research pertaining to this conclusion.
The present study compared the knowledge assessments
of experts and novices. In order to cover different scientific
traditions, the four disciplines history, medicine, physics, and
psychology were selected for the study. For example, psychology
and physics may differ in that physics has a clearer consensus
regarding its core content than psychology (Howell et al., 2014).
However, the notion of expertise is somewhat vague. In expert
research it has been argued that it takes about 10 years to become
an expert in a field (Hayes, 1989; Ericsson, 1996), although the
results in other studies have indicated that this time may be
shorter for more gifted persons (Hambrick et al., 2014).
In a (somewhat insufficient) attempt to approximate this,
experts in the present study were defined as persons with a Ph.D.
degree and novices as 1st-year undergraduate students in the
same discipline. Fisher and Kail (2016) differentiated between
passive and formal expertise where passive expertise is acquired
through every-day life experience and formal expertise through
many years of study of some topic. The experts in the present
study clearly belong to the formal type. Our expert participants
can be assumed to use much of their expert knowledge actively
in research and teaching and thereby to differ from the experts
used by Fisher and Kail (2016) (defined as having completed a
bachelor’s degree).
Out of the various dimensions of epistemic beliefs (see e.g.,
Schommer, 1990; Bråten and Strømsø, 2005; Teo, 2013; Sinatra
et al., 2014) we, within the limited scope of this study, only
investigated one dimension, belief in certainty of knowledge. Such
belief has to do with “how tentative or absolute and stable
knowledge is supposed to be” (Sinatra et al., 2014, p. 128; see also
e.g., Bråten and Strømsø, 2005). In addition, we only looked at
differences in general belief in certainty of knowledge and how
it relates to the ignorance/knowledge assessments of experts and
novices in different disciplines. Most research on epistemological
beliefs has used students or adolescents as participants and the
present study contributes by also investigating experts in different
disciplines. Thus, by including persons with a Ph.D. degree the
present study provides understanding of research disciplines as
such, not just, for example, of students’ conceptions about the
disciplines.
It is reasonable to think that experts, due to the expanded
view into the unknown allowable from their greater platform
of knowledge, should be able to see more of what is unknown
with respect to both their own and their discipline’s knowledge.
In order to test the idea that more knowledge is associated
with more perceived ignorance (e.g., Gross, 2007) we formulated
two hypotheses with respect to the relation between knowledge
level (expert, novice) and experienced knowledge. Hypothesis 1
expected that the level of experts’ rated own ignorance would be
greater (Study 1) and the level of their own knowledge, out of
everything there is to know in their expert area, would be lower
(Study 2), compared to novices’ ratings of the extent of their
own knowledge. In line with this, Hypothesis 2 was that experts’
rated level of the extent of knowledge in their discipline out of
everything there is to know in that discipline area would be lower
than the corresponding rating by novices (Studies 1 and 2).
Our final two hypotheses related to the participants’ belief
in certainty of knowledge. Hypothesis 3 was that experts would
show a lower level of belief in certainty of knowledge than
novices. This is in line with research on the development of
epistemological beliefs (Perry, 1970; Kuhn et al., 2000; Sinatra
et al., 2014). On the basis of this research it is reasonable to expect
that the experts would show a higher level of epistemological
development than the novices and thus lower belief in certainty
of knowledge. Hypothesis 4 expected that the participants’ level
of belief in certainty of knowledge would be positively associated
with the level of their knowledge ratings for knowledge in their
own and other disciplines. For people with a high level of belief
in certainty of knowledge the task to establish knowledge is
likely to seem simpler than for people with less belief in the
certainty of knowledge. Given a higher level of belief in certainty
of knowledge it would thus seem reasonable to be prepared to
believe that more knowledge has been secured out of all possible
knowledge to find. We did not expect that the participants’ ratings
of their own ignorance/knowledge would be associated with their
belief in certainty of knowledge, since assessments of one’s own
knowledge may to a higher extent rely on other types of evidence
than belief in certainty of knowledge.
STUDY 1
Study 1 examined how experts and novices judged their
ignorance when asked to think about what they do not know
within a specific area and they were also asked how much is known
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in the same areas. In addition, ratings of belief in certainty of
knowledge were studied.
Method
Participants
The participants were 207 novices and 239 experts from nine
Swedish universities. All participants were active in one of the
four disciplines: history, medicine, physics, and psychology (see
Table 1). The novices’ average age was 24 years (SD = 7.5)
and 49% were women. The experts’ average age was 51 years
(SD = 13.4) and 37% were women. The novices had on
average 1 year (range 0–6, SD = 0.8) education experience
within their discipline and the majority (94%) had no academic
degree. The experts had an average of 22.2 years (range 1–70,
SD = 13.8) research experience. Thirty-eight percent of the
experts were research associates, 37% associate professors and
35% full professors.
Questionnaires
Data was collected using a web-based questionnaire. In the first
part of the questionnaire the participants assessed their own
ignorance, that is, how much knowledge they do not have of
everything there is to know for a number of subareas in each
of four disciplines. In the next part of the questionnaire, they
assessed how much is known in a number of subareas in each
of the four disciplines. Inspired by a study by Allwood and
Granhag (1996) the two types of questions were (translated
from Swedish) formulated as follows: “How much of everything
there is to know in the following subject areas do you not have
knowledge about?” and “How much of everything there is to
know in the following subject areas is today known knowledge
for one or several people?”. The participants were asked to make
assessments in relation to “all there is to know” in each area with
the explanation that “all there is to know” also includes such
knowledge that is not known today, but which in the future may
be. Both types of knowledge assessments were made on a scale
where the response options ranged from 0% = No knowledge, to
100%= All knowledge, in increments of 10.
The four disciplines history, medicine, physics, and
psychology were represented by 18 sub-disciplines (see
Appendix A). Participants assessed both their own knowledge,
and how much knowledge is known, for all 18 sub-disciplines
in their own discipline and for 6 sub-disciplines within each
of the other three disciplines (these sub-disciplines were the
same for all participants; see Appendix A). In total, the survey
consisted of 36 knowledge assessment items for each of the two
types of knowledge assessments (own ignorance, knowledge in
disciplines). The order of the different knowledge assessments
as well as the sub-disciplines was counterbalanced with the
exception that all participants judged their own discipline field
first.
Finally, the web-questionnaire presented two items on belief in
certainty of knowledge, taken from the “certainty of knowledge”
factor, one of the four factors in the Bråten and Strømsø (2005)
epistemological belief scale. The other three factors in the Bråten
and Strømsø scale were labeled “speed of knowledge acquisition,”
“knowledge construction and modification,” and “control of
knowledge acquisition.” The two items used in the present study
(“If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost
everything” and “Scientists can ultimately get to the truth”) were
the items with the highest factor loadings and the best face
validity in the “certainty of knowledge” factor. The measure with
these two items is henceforth called the Belief in Certainty of
Knowledge Scale (BCKS). The items were rated on a scale that
range from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. A high
value indicates a high belief in certainty of knowledge and a lower
value indicates a more relativistic view.
Procedure
E-mail addresses were collected from the departments relating
to history, medicine, physics, and psychology at Swedish
universities. Experts and novices were contacted through their
e-mail addresses with an invitation to participate in the web-
based questionnaire. Those who participated were included in the
draw for a gift certificate of 1,000 SEK (at the time approximately
115 USD). The questionnaire took about 10 min to answer. The
invitation was sent to 2,216 persons and a reminder 1 week later.
The initial response rate was 31.0%, more specifically, 31.6% of
the experts and 30.6% of the novices started the survey. Data from
participants who chose to cancel the form, or had more than five
unanswered questions were excluded. The final response rate was
20.1%. More specifically, 18.7% of the experts, and 20.1% of the
novices, completed the survey. According to chi-square analysis
there was no difference between the number of experts and
novices who started and completed the questionnaire (p > 0.05).
Results
Means and standard deviations for the different knowledge
assessments: own ignorance in own discipline, own discipline’s
knowledge, own ignorance in the other three disciplines, and
TABLE 1 | Distribution of participants in each discipline.
Study 1 Study 2
Novices (n) Experts (n) Total (N) Novices (n) Experts (n) Total (N)
History (n) 53 29 82 29 26 55
Medicine (n) 46 106 152 80 46 126
Physics (n) 64 48 112 42 25 67
Psychology (n) 44 56 100 43 44 87
Total (N) 207 239 446 194 141 335
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other disciplines’ knowledge, are presented separately for experts
and novices in Table 2.
To test the hypotheses we conducted analyses of variance.
Theoretically a MANOVA should have been used to analyze the
data, however, due to presence of multicollinearity between the
dependent variables; this type of analyses was not performed.
The dependent variables own ignorance within own discipline,
knowledge within own discipline, own ignorance within other
disciplines, knowledge within other disciplines, and belief
in certainty of knowledge (BCKS) were therefore analyzed
separately. More specifically, we performed five independent
two-way ANOVA/ANCOVA’s with the between-group variables
knowledge level (expert, novice) and discipline (history, medicine,
physics, and psychology), and one mixed ANOVA with the
within-group variable knowledge assessment (own discipline,
other disciplines) and the between-group variable discipline. The
BCKS ratings were included as a covariate when this measure
was found to be correlated with the knowledge assessments.
Hierarchical regression analysis was not used due to that the
discipline variable does not have a clear reference group or
logical order, which makes the interpretation of the correlation
coefficients more difficult. Therefore, ANCOVA was better
suited to analyze the effect of two categorical variables, and
to control for the impact of a possible confounding variable,
namely the BCKS. Finally, correlations between BCKS ratings
and knowledge assessments were analyzed separately for experts
and novices. Cronbach’s alpha for the participants’ assessments
of their own ignorance was 0.96 (history: 0.97, medicine: 0.96,
physics: 0.97, and psychology: 0.96), and 0.98 (history: 0.98,
medicine: 0.98, physics: 0.98, and psychology: 0.98) for the
assessments of how much that is known in the respective
discipline. Cronbach’s alpha for the BCKS was 0.88.
Assessment of Own Ignorance in the Participants’
Own Discipline
In contrast to Hypothesis 1, experts (M = 29.7%, SD = 19.6%)
estimated their own ignorance as lower than the novices
(M= 18.8%, SD= 17.7%), F(1,437)= 42.04, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.07.
There was a main effect of discipline, F(3,437) = 9.82, p < 0.001.
The LSD post hoc test showed that the historians (M = 33.0%,
TABLE 2 | Mean and standard deviations for the four types of knowledge
assessments (in percentages), separately for experts and novices, in
Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1 Study 2
Experts Novices Experts Novices
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Own ignorance – within
own discipline
29.7 (19.6) 18.8 (17.7) 25.9 (18.1) 16.2 (15.5)
Knowledge – within
own discipline
47.9 (21.9) 42.9 (22.2) 44.6 (21.5) 47.6 (21.8)
Own ignorance – within
other disciplines
12.0 (18.0) 10.0 (13.5) 8.3 (9.7) 9.2 (10.3)
Knowledge – within
other disciplines
48.5 (22.7) 47.1 (24.2) 46.0 (21.5) 51.3 (22.3)
SD = 20.5%) estimated their own ignorance lower than the
other disciplines (medicine: M = 23.7%, SD = 19.6%, physics:
M = 19.5%, SD = 17.4%, psychology: M = 25.1%, SD = 18.6%),
p < 0.01. No significant differences were found between medics,
physicists, and psychologists, p > 0.05. There was no interaction
effect between knowledge level and discipline, F(3,437) = 2.04,
p= 0.108.
Assessments of Knowledge in the Participants’ Own
Discipline
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, no difference was found between
experts’ (M = 47.9%, SD = 21.9%) and novices’ (M = 42.9%,
SD = 22.2%) estimations of how much knowledge there is in
their own discipline, F(1,404) = 1.78, p = 0.183. However,
a main effect was found for discipline, F(3,404) = 4.12,
p = 0.007, η2 = 0.03. The LSD post hoc test showed that
medics (M = 51.0%, SD = 20.0%) estimated knowledge in their
own discipline significantly higher than historians (M = 40.2%,
SD = 23.9%) and physicists (M = 42.2%, SD = 23.4%), p < 0.01,
but not significantly higher than psychologists (M = 45.7%,
SD = 20.7%), p = 0.09. No significant differences were found
between historians, physicists and psychologists, p > 0.05. An
interaction effect was also found between knowledge level and
discipline, F(3,404) = 4.74, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.03. Specifically, as
shown in Figure 1 (see also Appendix B), novices (M = 35.6%,
SD = 20.6%) and experts (M = 51.3%, SD = 24.2%) in physics
differed in their knowledge assessments, p < 0.001, while no
differences were found for historians (novices: M = 42.9%,
SD = 23.8%, experts: M = 35.4%, SD = 23.7%, p = 0.054),
medics (novices: M = 49.0%, SD = 24.1%, experts: M = 52.0%,
SD = 17.7%, p = 0.393), and psychologists (novices: M = 47.5%,
SD = 17.8%, experts: M = 44.2%, SD = 22.9%, p = 0.373).
The covariate, (i.e., the BCKS ratings) was related to the
participants’ assessments of knowledge in their own discipline,
F(1,404)= 10.25, p= 0.001, η2 = 0.02. Higher BCKS ratings were
associated with higher knowledge assessments, r= 0.15, p < 0.01.
Assessment of Own Ignorance Outside the
Participants’ Own Discipline
No significant main effect was found for knowledge level (experts,
novices) when the participants rated their own ignorance
outside their own discipline, F(1,427) = 0.96, p = 0.328,
experts (M = 12.0%, SD = 18.0%) and novices (M = 10.0%,
SD = 13.5%). Similarly, no main effect was found for discipline,
F(3,427) = 0.25, p = 0.860. Thus, there were no significant
differences between how historians (M = 10.6%, SD = 19.3%),
medics (M = 11.5%, SD = 17.3%), physicists (M = 10.0%,
SD = 12.8%), and psychologists (M = 12.0%, SD = 14.6%) rated
their ignorance outside their own discipline. Moreover, there
was no significant interaction effect between knowledge level and
discipline, F(3,427)= 0.46, p= 0.709.
Assessments of Knowledge Outside the Participants’
Own Discipline
The results showed no main effect for knowledge level,
F(1,394) = 0.02, p = 0.878. Thus, no difference was found
between how experts (M = 48.5%, SD = 22.7%) and novices
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FIGURE 1 | Mean scores for experts and novices in the different disciplines with respect to their assessments of knowledge in their own discipline in
Study 1. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.
(M = 47.1%, SD = 24.2%) rated knowledge outside the own
discipline. However, there was a main effect for discipline,
F(3,394) = 8.19, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.06. The LSD post
hoc test showed that historians (M = 35.2%, SD = 24.4%)
estimated knowledge outside their own discipline lower than
medics (M = 51.5%, SD = 21.1%), physicists (M = 51.9%,
SD = 24.2%) and psychologists (M = 48.0%, SD = 21.7%),
p < 0.01. No significant differences were found between medics,
physicists, and psychologists, p > 0.05. No interaction effect was
found between knowledge level and discipline, F(3,394) = 0.55,
p = 0.652. The participants’ BCKS ratings were related to
their assessments of knowledge outside their own discipline,
F(1,394)= 7.44, p= 0.007, η2 = 0.02. Higher BCKS ratings were
associated with higher knowledge assessments, r= 0.16, p < 0.01.
Comparison of Discipline-Related Knowledge
Assessments between the Four Disciplines
There was a significant main effect for knowledge assessment,
F(1,414) = 7.41, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.04. The participants’
knowledge assessments were significantly lower when they
judged their own discipline (M = 45.4%, SD= 22.2%) compared
with the other disciplines (M = 47.8%, SD = 23.3%). There was
also a main effect for discipline, F(3,414) = 5.23, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.02. The LSD post hoc test showed that historians
(M = 38.9%, SD = 24.8%) generally made lower knowledge
estimations than the medics (M= 50.8%, SD= 20.5%), physicists
(M = 46.8%, SD = 23.7%), and psychologists (M = 46.7%,
SD = 21.0%), p < 0.05. No differences were found between the
three other disciplines, p > 0.05. A significant interaction effect,
F(3,414) = 17.80, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.13, showed that historians
were the only group that rated knowledge in their own subject
field (M = 41.3%, SD = 24.5%) higher than knowledge in other
disciplines (M = 36.5%, SD = 25.1%). Hence, all the other
groups estimated that there was more knowledge in the other
three disciplines (medics: M = 51.1%, SD = 21.0%, physicists:
M= 51.8%, SD= 24.1%, psychologists: M= 47.7%, SD= 21.4%),
compared to their own area (medics: M = 50.6%, SD = 20.0%,
physicists: M = 41.7%, SD = 23.3%, psychologists: M = 45.7%,
SD= 20.6%, see Figure 2 and Appendix B). Noteworthy, analysis
of simple effects showed that the difference between the two
knowledge assessments was significant only among the historians
(p= 0.003) and the physicists (p < 0.001).
Comparison of Belief in Certainty of Knowledge
between Novices and Experts and between
Disciplines
There was a main effect of level of expertise F(1,411) = 8.14,
p = 0.005, η2 = 0.02. In support of Hypothesis 3, novices
(M = 2.7, SD = 1.2) believed more in certainty knowledge
than experts (M = 2.5, SD = 1.3). A main effect of discipline
was found, F(3,411) = 3.36, p = 0.019, η2 = 0.02. Post hoc
analyses with Bonferroni corrections showed that the participants
from the history discipline (M = 2.4, SD = 1.2) believed less
in certainty knowledge than the other participants (physics:
M = 2.8, SD = 1.2, psychology: M = 2.5, SD = 1.3, medicine:
M = 2.6, SD = 1.2), p < 0.05. No significant interaction effect
was found, F(3,411)= 2.25, p= 0.082, η2 = 0.02.
Relationship between Belief in Certainty of
Knowledge and Knowledge Assessments
As can be seen in Table 3, the BCKS ratings were only
significantly correlated with some knowledge assessments for
the experts and none for the novices, thus providing partial
support for Hypothesis 4. For experts, the BCKS ratings were
significantly correlated with knowledge assessments involving
the discipline’s knowledge [within own discipline: r(212) = 0.28,
p < 0.001, within other disciplines: r(204) = 0.28, p < 0.001],
but not the participant’s own knowledge [within own discipline:
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FIGURE 2 | Mean scores of the participants’ knowledge assessments within their own and other disciplines in Study 1. Error bars indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
r(217) = 0.07, p = 0.298, within other disciplines: r(215) = 0.02,
p = 0.731]. For novices, no significant correlations were found
between the BCKS ratings and assessments of the participants’
own knowledge [within own discipline: r(197)= 0.10, p= 0.171,
within other disciplines: r(197) = 0.08, p = 0.294] or the
discipline’s knowledge [within own discipline: r(197) = 0.04,
p= 0.542, within other disciplines: r(195)= 0.04, p= 0.583].
STUDY 2
In order to explore if ratings of ignorance differ from ratings
of knowledge, we conducted a second study, replicating Study 1
with the exception that the participants in Study 2 were asked to
rate their knowledge instead of their ignorance (as in Study 1).
A similar framing manipulation has previously been used in a
study by Allwood and Granhag (1996), where they concluded that
TABLE 3 | Bivariate correlations between belief in certainty of knowledge
and the four types of knowledge assessments.
Belief in certainty of knowledge
Study 1 Study 2
Experts Novices Experts Novices
Own ignorance – within
own discipline
0.07 0.10 0.07 0.09
Knowledge – within
own discipline
0.28∗∗∗ 0.04 0.22∗ 0.18∗
Own ignorance – within
other disciplines
0.02 0.08 0.12 0.03
Knowledge – within
other disciplines
0.28∗∗∗ 0.04 0.29∗∗ 0.14
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
the knowledge assessments were unaffected by this manipulation.
Therefore, in line with these findings, we expected Study 2 to
replicate the results from Study 1.
Method
Participants
The participants were 194 novices and 141 experts from 17
Swedish universities. As in Study 1, the recruited participants
were active in one of the four disciplines history, medicine,
physics, or psychology (see Table 1). The novices’ average age
was 25 years (SD = 7.1) and 56% were women. The experts’
average age was 51 years (SD = 10.9) and 39% were women. The
novices had on average 1 year (range 0–6, SD = 0.8) education
experience within their discipline and the majority (94%) had
no academic degree. The experts had an average of 18.9 years
(range 2–80, SD= 11.4) research experience. Forty-eight percent
were research associates, 28% associate professors and 24% full
professors.
Questionnaires
Study 2 was conducted with the same questionnaire as Study
1, with the exception that the framing was changed so that the
participants now judged how much knowledge they have, instead
of how much they do not have (“How much of everything there
is to know in the following subject areas do you have knowledge
about?”). The response scale was the same in both studies.
Procedure
Study 2 was conducted in the same way as Study 1. Individuals
who had participated in Study 1 were excluded. The invitation,
with reminder, was sent to 1,635 individuals. The initial response
rate was 22.3%. 25.9% of the experts and 20.2% of the novices
started the survey. Just as in Study 1, we excluded participants
who decided to cancel the questionnaire or had more than
five unanswered questions. The final response rate was 20.5%;
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24.0% of the experts and 18.5% of the novices completed the
survey. Chi-square analysis showed that more experts started and
completed the questionnaire than novices (p < 0.01).
Results
Means and standard deviations for the different knowledge
assessments of: own knowledge in own discipline, own
discipline’s knowledge, own knowledge in the three other
disciplines, and other disciplines’ knowledge, are presented
separately for experts and novices in Table 2. Just as in Study 1,
the hypotheses were investigated with five independent two-way
ANOVA/ANCOVA’s with the between-group variables knowledge
level (expert, novice) and discipline (history, medicine, physics,
and psychology), and one mixed ANOVA with the within-group
variable knowledge assessment (own discipline, other disciplines)
and the between-group variable discipline. BCKS was included as
a covariate when it was found to be significantly correlated with
the knowledge assessments. Correlations between BCKS ratings
and knowledge assessments were analyzed separately for experts
and novices. Cronbach’s alpha for the participants’ assessments
of their own knowledge was 0.94 (history: 0.97, medicine: 0.96,
physics: 0.96, and psychology: 0.97) and for their assessments
of how much that is known in the respective disciplines, 0.98
(history: 0.99, medicine: 0.98, physics: 0.98, and psychology:
0.98). The BCKS showed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84.
Assessments of Own Knowledge in the Participants’
Own Discipline
In contrast to our first hypothesis, experts (M = 25.9%,
SD = 18.1%) estimated their own knowledge higher than the
novices (M = 16.2%, SD = 15.5%), F(1,312) = 17.48, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.05. The results also showed a main effect for discipline,
F(3,312) = 15.59, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.12. The Games-Howell
post hoc test showed that historians (M = 26.3%, SD = 17.1%)
and psychologists (M = 29.2%, SD = 19.8%) rated their
knowledge significantly higher than both physicists (M = 13.1%,
SD = 13.0%) and medics (M = 15.6%, SD = 14.0%), p < 0.001.
There was no significant interaction effect between knowledge
level and discipline, F(3,312)= 2.27, p= 0.080.
Assessments of Knowledge in the Participants’ Own
Discipline
In contrast to our second hypothesis, no significant difference
was found between experts (M = 44.6%, SD = 21.5%) and
novices (M = 47.6%, SD = 21.8%) when they estimated
how much knowledge that is known in their own discipline,
F(1,285) = 0.93, p = 0.335. However, a significant main effect
was found for discipline, F(3,285) = 4.17, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.04.
The LSD post hoc test showed that historians (M = 39.7%,
SD = 22.6%) and physicists (M = 41.4%, SD = 22.3%) rated
the knowledge in their own discipline as lower than both medics
(M = 49.6%, SD = 21.7%) and psychologists (M = 49.8%,
SD = 19.3%), p < 0.05. No interaction effect was found between
knowledge level and discipline, F(3,285) = 1.25, p = 0.292. The
participants’ BCKS ratings were related to their assessments of
knowledge in their own discipline, F(1,285) = 10.38, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.03. Higher ratings were associated with higher knowledge
assessments, r = 0.21, p < 0.01.
Assessment of Own Knowledge Outside the
Participants’ Own Discipline
No significant difference was found between experts’ (M = 8.3%,
SD= 9.7%) and novices’ (M = 9.2%, SD= 10.3%) ratings of their
own knowledge outside their own discipline, F(1,305) = 3.20,
p = 0.075. However, there was a main effect for discipline,
F(3,305) = 5.58, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.05. The Games-Howell post
hoc test showed that physicists (M = 5.5%, SD = 4.9%) rated
their knowledge outside their own discipline significantly lower
than both medics (M = 9.2%, SD = 10.1%), and psychologists
(M = 11.6%, SD = 12.0%), p < 0.05, but not significantly
lower than the historians (M = 7.5%, SD = 10.0%), p > 0.05.
There was also an interaction effect between knowledge level
and discipline, F(3,305) = 2.89, p = 0.036, η2 = 0.03. Within
medicine, the experts (M = 10.9%, SD = 11.3%) rated their
knowledge higher than the novices (M = 8.2%, SD = 9.3%, see
Figure 3 and Appendix B). Within the three other disciplines the
novices (history: M = 9.8%, SD = 12.2%, physics: M = 6.2%,
SD = 5.1%, psychology: M = 13.7%, SD = 12.9%) gave higher
knowledge assessments than the experts (history: M = 4.5%,
SD = 4.9%, physics: M = 4.5%, SD = 4.5%, psychology:
M = 9.6%, SD = 10.8%). However, analyses of simple effects
showed no significant differences between the experts and the
novices within each discipline, p > 0.05.
Assessments of Knowledge Outside the Participants’
Own Discipline
No difference was found between how experts (M = 46.0%,
SD = 21.5%) and novices (M = 51.3%, SD = 22.3%) rated
knowledge outside their own discipline, F(1,278) = 2.84,
p = 0.093. However, a main effect was found for discipline,
F(3,278) = 5.03, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.05. The Bonferroni post
hoc test showed that historians (M = 36.6%, SD = 24.0%)
estimated knowledge outside their own discipline significantly
lower than both medics (M = 51.1%, SD = 22.6%), physicists
(M = 50.6%, SD = 21.4%), and psychologists (M = 52.3%,
SD = 18.6%), p < 0.05. However, no significant differences were
found between medics, physicists, and psychologists, p > 0.05.
No significant interaction effect was found between knowledge
level and discipline, F(3,278) = 0.25, p = 0.865. Furthermore, a
relationship was found between the participants’ BCKS ratings
and the assessments of knowledge outside their own discipline,
F(1,278)= 8.60, p= 0.004, η2 = 0.03. Higher ratings on the scale
were associated with higher knowledge assessments, r = 0.22,
p < 0.01.
Comparison of Discipline-Related Knowledge
Assessments between the Four Disciplines
The results showed a significant main effect for knowledge
assessment, F(1,297) = 12.47, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.07. The
participants’ knowledge assessments were significantly lower
when they were judging their own discipline (M = 45.6%,
SD = 21.8%) compared with the other disciplines (M = 48.4%,
SD = 22.5%). There was also a main effect for discipline,
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FIGURE 3 | Mean scores for experts and novices in the different disciplines with respect to their assessments of their own knowledge outside their
own discipline in Study 2. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.
FIGURE 4 | Mean scores of the participants’ knowledge assessments within their own and other disciplines in Study 2. Error bars indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
F(3,297) = 5.51, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.04. The LSD post hoc test
showed that historians (M = 37.2%, SD= 22.7%) generally made
lower knowledge estimations than both the medics (M = 50.3%,
SD = 21.8%) and the psychologists (M = 50.5%, SD = 19.4%),
p < 0.01. However, no significant differences were found between
medics, psychologists, and physicists (M = 44.2%, SD = 22.9%),
p > 0.05. A significant interaction effect, F(3,297) = 7.65,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.08, showed that historians were the
only group that rated knowledge in their own subject field
(M = 38.1%, SD = 21.7%) higher than knowledge in other
disciplines (M = 36.3%, SD = 23.7%). Hence, all the other
groups estimated that there was more knowledge in the other
three disciplines (medics: M = 51.0%, SD = 22.2%, physicists:
M= 48.7%, SD= 22.9%, psychologists: M= 51.6%, SD= 19.4%),
compared to their own area (medics: M = 49.6%, SD = 21.4%,
physicists: M = 39.7%, SD = 22.9%, psychologists: M = 49.3%,
SD= 19.5%, see Figure 4 and Appendix B). Noteworthy, analysis
of simple effects showed that the difference between the two
knowledge assessments was significant only among the physicists
(p < 0.001).
Comparison of Belief in Certainty of Knowledge
between Novices and Experts and between
Disciplines
There was a main effect of level of expertise F(1,296) = 10.36,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.03. In support of our Hypothesis 3, novices
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(M = 2.9, SD = 1.1) believed more in certainty of knowledge
than experts (M = 2.5, SD = 1.2). A main effect of discipline
was also found, F(3,296) = 3.18, p = 0.024, η2 = 0.03. Post
hoc analyses with LSD adjustments showed that the historians
(M = 2.3, SD= 1.2) believed less in certainty knowledge than the
medics (M = 2.8, SD = 1.1) and physicists (M = 3.0, SD = 1.2),
p < 0.05. No significant differences were found between medics,
physicists, and psychologists (M = 2.6, SD = 1.1), p > 0.05.
No significant interaction effect was found, F(3,296) = 1.81,
p= 0.145, η2 = 0.02.
Relationship between Belief in Certainty of
Knowledge and Knowledge Assessments
With partial support for Hypothesis 4, the BCKS ratings were
significantly correlated with the experts’ knowledge assessments
that involved the discipline’s knowledge [within own discipline:
r(119) = 0.22, p = 0.013, within other disciplines: r(115) = 0.29,
p = 0.002], but not with assessments of one’s own knowledge
[within own discipline: r(126) = 0.07, p = 0.455, within other
disciplines: r(123)= 0.12, p= 0.200], see Table 3. For the novices,
the BCKS ratings were found to be significantly correlated with
assessments of the known knowledge in the own discipline
[r(171) = 0.18, p = 0.017] but not within other disciplines
[r(168) = 0.14, p = 0.080], and not with assessments of own
knowledge [within own discipline: r(172) = 0.09, p = 0.237,
within other disciplines: r(172)= 0.03, p= 0.704].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study investigated experts’ and novices’ assessments
of their own knowledge and of the extent of knowledge in general
within their own and other disciplines out of everything there
is to know. In order to study potential disciplinary differences
we included participants from history, medicine, physics, and
psychology. We also asked the participants about their general
belief in certainty of knowledge in order to examine the relation
between this belief and the level of the participants’ knowledge
assessments.
We first tested if the commonly known assertion “the more
you know, the more you realize you do not know” is correct. If
so, experts in an area should rate themselves as more ignorant and
less knowledgeable in that area compared to novices (Hypothesis
1). In contrast to our expectation, the results, over both studies,
showed that the experts rated their own knowledge higher than
the novices rated their own knowledge, irrespective of whether
they assessed their ignorance or their knowledge. Although this
result refuted our hypothesis, it is in line with the expected
actual knowledge level of experts and novices. The knowledge
assessments in this study can be seen as global judgments
involving a smaller or larger knowledge area. This type of
judgment has in research on confidence judgments been found
to be associated with a broader range of considerations by
the person making the judgment, compared with item specific
judgments where the person considers matters more specific
to the item (Sniezek and Buckley, 1991). The experts’ self-
understanding as experts, in the sense of being knowledgeable
about the area (and thus as persons who are likely to know a lot),
may have contributed to their higher knowledge assessments.
Following this reasoning, the same considerations may have led
novices to decrease their knowledge ratings.
We also expected experts to rate what is known within their
own discipline (out of all there is to know) lower compared to the
novices (Hypothesis 2). Studies 1 and 2 showed no support for
this hypothesis. Overall, with the exception of physics in Study 1
(where the experts rated the knowledge as greater), experts and
novices did not differ with respect to their perception of how
much is known in their discipline. Given the lack of support
for Hypotheses 1 and 2, “one of the most pervasive conceptual
metaphors,” that is, the perception metaphor “knowing is seeing”
(Johnson, 1993, p. 419), and specifically thinking about this
seeing as seeing over fields or areas of knowledge, may not be
fully appropriate. Instead, other ways of thinking about ignorance
might be more fruitful to use, for example walking in a thick
jungle where it is difficult to see the environment.
The only result remotely supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2 was
found when the assessments of knowledge within one’s own
discipline were compared with the same persons’ assessments
of knowledge in other disciplines. Here the results showed that,
especially in physics, the perceived knowledge in one’s own
discipline was less than what was perceived in other disciplines.
However, this tendency was small in psychology and medicine
and was reversed in history. Thus, it seems fair to conclude
that this result is apparent only for physics. Nevertheless, this
finding is interesting in its own right, considering reports that at
least some researchers in physics at the end of the 19th century
thought that most of what there is to know on a general level
in physics was known. For example, in a dedication speech for
Ryerson Physics Lab, at the University of Chicago in 1894, Albert
Michelson is reputed to have stated that “the more important
fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been
discovered, and these are so firmly established that the possibility
of their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries
is exceedingly remote [...] Our future discoveries must be looked
for in the sixth place of decimals” (cited in Mari, 2005, p. 260).
Given that our results generalize to other samples, physicists’
perception of how much remains to be known in their discipline
has changed a lot since Michelson’s time.
In this context it is also worth to note that, in line with
our expectation, the framing of the assessment question in
terms of ignorance (Study 1) or knowledge (Study 2) did
not influence the results very much since Study 2 to a large
extent replicated the results of Study 1. This result is in
line with previous research by Allwood and Granhag (1996)
where two different samples were used and the framing of the
knowledge assessment, as relating to the participants’ ignorance
or knowledge, did not appear to influence the assessments. This
result suggests that people may use similar cues when assessing
their ignorance in a domain as when assessing their knowledge,
perhaps influenced by examples of knowledge on both occasions.
It is possible that humans are more naturally oriented toward
thinking about what they know compared with thinking about
what they do not know, just as people are more willing to
seek confirmatory than disconfirmatory feedback regarding their
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 377
fpsyg-08-00377 March 15, 2017 Time: 16:5 # 11
Hansson et al. Perceptions of Ignorance and Knowledge
hypotheses (confirmation bias, e.g., Nickerson, 1998; Jonas et al.,
2001). This may be one reason why the framing used in Study
1 (“ignorance”) and Study 2 (“knowledge”) did not make much
difference for the participants’ knowledge assessments. Future
research should continue to examine factors that may contribute
to an awareness of our ignorance. Such understanding could, for
example, help prevent erroneous risk assessments (Ravetz, 1987,
1993).
It is also of interest to consider the absolute level of
the assessments. Here it is noteworthy that the knowledge
assessments were, in general, quite high. For instance, the
participants estimated that about 40–50% of all there is to know
within their own discipline is already known. Furthermore,
the average difference between the experts and novices was
quite small. In our two studies, the experts estimated that they
themselves knew approximately 26–30% of all there is to know
in their discipline and the corresponding rating for novices was
16–19%. It is also of relevance to note that the only identified
difference between experts and novices was when they assessed
their own knowledge within their own discipline.
Differences in the Knowledge
Assessments between the Disciplines
Although the results show that the differences between experts
and novices were largely unaffected by discipline, our study
contributes to understanding differences between the four
disciplines. For instance, assessments from participants within
the history discipline tended to stand out from those of
the other disciplines. In both studies, historians (including
both experts and novices) reported that they themselves
knew more of their discipline compared to the corresponding
ratings by members of the other disciplines. Moreover, in
both studies, historians and physicists assessed that less was
known within their discipline (about 40% of all there is to
know) compared to medics (approximately 50%). In addition,
compared to the participants in the three other disciplines,
only the historians rated the level of knowledge in other
disciplines as lower than that in their own discipline. In
other words, historians appeared to be less impressed with
the extent of disciplinary knowledge than members of the
other disciplines. These findings are in line with research
showing that historians have a greater awareness of the
relativity, but still usefulness, of different perspectives in
order to better understand historical events (Wineburg, 1998;
Wolfe and Goldman, 2005). We suggest that future research,
aiming to improve our understanding of research disciplines’
self-understanding and their understanding of other disciplines,
would benefit from further exploring researchers’ assessments of
the extent of disciplines’ knowledge and the limitations of such
knowledge.
Belief in Certainty of Knowledge
Studies 1 and 2 also showed consistency in the ratings
of BCKS for the two levels of expertise, with respect to
different disciplines, and the relationship between BCKS and
knowledge assessments. In line with previous developmental
research on belief in certainty of knowledge (e.g., Kuhn
et al., 2000) and Hypothesis 3, the experts reported a lower
belief in certainty of knowledge than the novices. It can be
noted that the influence of experts’ lower degree of belief
in certainty of knowledge did not stop them from assessing
the level of their knowledge as greater than that of the
novices.
Hypothesis 4 expected that the BCKS ratings would be
positively associated with the assessments of knowledge in one’s
own and the other disciplines. This hypothesis received partial
support. The expected relationship was found for assessments
of known knowledge within disciplines among experts, but,
in general, not among novices. Moreover, in line with our
hypothesis, the BCKS ratings were not correlated with the
assessments of one’s own knowledge. These findings suggest
that the understanding of own knowledge within and outside
one’s own discipline, and for experts as well as novices, may be
influenced by other types of cues that are more relevant for the
assessments of own knowledge, for example their awareness of
being an “expert” or “novice” within the area. However, only
the experts’ knowledge may have been sufficiently well-integrated
to be affected by their general belief in certainty of knowledge.
Future research should continue to explore these issues, for
example with respect to the relation between age and use of
epistemic beliefs when assessing the extent of knowledge in
different knowledge domains such as research disciplines.
The results also showed that the disciplines differed in degree
of belief in certainty of knowledge. Thus, the historians showed
a lower level of belief in certainty of knowledge than participants
from the other disciplines. This finding may contribute to explain
why historians, in general, made lower knowledge assessments
than participants from other disciplines. However, the design
used in the present study does not allow for causal inferences
about how belief in certainty of knowledge affects knowledge
assessments. It is possible that knowledge assessments as well
as belief in certainty of knowledge are influenced by a general
epistemological ethos. Future research should seek to explore this
issue further.
Our results are of interest in different practical contexts
such as higher education teaching contexts. For example, it
might be relevant for teachers in the respective disciplines to
note that the difference in the experts’ (26–30%) and novices’
(16–19%) estimates of how much they know of all there is
to know in their discipline can be seen as fairly low. This
could indicate that at least the novices’ (students’) estimates are
inflated and that they might be more open to the challenges of
research if they had somewhat more modest assessments of their
own knowledge. Furthermore, our results concerning differences
between experts and novices in degree of certainty of knowledge
suggest that students may profit by more explicit teaching in
epistemological aspects of their discipline. Moreover, our results
are also of interest in interdisciplinary collaboration contexts.
In such contexts a commonly recognized difficulty is that
researchers have insufficient understanding of the characteristics
of research in other disciplines than their own and our results
can contribute to such understanding (Defila and Di Giullo,
2010).
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Limitations
The negation used in the framing of Study 1, where the
participants were asked to rate what they do not know, may
have caused confusion for some participants. This issue was
dealt with in Study 2, where the negation was removed and
the results, to a great extent, were replicated. This is in line
with research by Allwood and Granhag (1996) showing that
knowledge assessments may not be sensitive to these types of
framing effects (i.e., ratings of knowledge or ignorance). Thus, this
problem may not have affected the results to any greater extent.
As expected, strong correlations were found between level
of expertise (expert, novice) and age (Study 1, r = 0.77;
Study 2, r = 0.83). Although our experts and novices were
clearly different in terms of disciplinary experience (education,
research experience) and in terms of academic job experience
(presumably also including teaching the discipline), because of
the just mentioned strong correlations the difference between
experts and novices could at least partly be conceived to be
an effect of age rather than of knowledge. The fact that we
found no difference between experts’ and novices’ knowledge
assessments outside their own discipline indicates that such an
effect of age at least probably was not absolute. If age had
explained the results rather than expertise one would have
expected an expert-novice difference also outside the experts’
own discipline, even if smaller than the difference within the
own discipline. However, it is still possible that age to some
degree may also have contributed to the expert-novice differences
found. In general, it is not unproblematic to separate these
factors because excellence requires many years of practical and
theoretical experience (Ericsson et al., 2006). Likewise, a general,
and possibly relevant, effect of age may be “cognitive maturation,”
but such maturation is also likely to be influenced by the
difference in academic training between the experts and novices.
Future studies should examine if age correlates with greater
insight into one’s own ignorance, regardless of the individual’s
knowledge.
It should also be noted that there was a high internal
consistency in the knowledge estimates. The fact that
individuals are likely to make similar assessments across
different disciplines indicates that the assessments were to
some extent driven by general personal tendencies. Notably,
the internal consistency were slightly higher for estimates
of known knowledge compared to own knowledge, which
indicates that individuals are more likely to differentiate between
disciplines in assessments concerning their own knowledge.
In this context it is of interest that the participants’ shown
insensitivity to the differences between the disciplines with
respect to known knowledge matches the finding in research
on confidence judgments of a general confidence trait in
adults (Kleitman and Stankov, 2007). Despite this, we found
differences also for assessments of known knowledge; the
participants rated knowledge in their own discipline lower
compared to disciplines outside the participants’ own subject
area.
A further limitation is the low response rates in both
studies (approximately 20%). The samples could therefore be
unrepresentative for their populations. This is a common issue
with this type of data collection. However, the fact that many
of the results were replicated in two studies conducted with
independent samples should be considered as a strength in this
context.
Future studies should investigate if our results hold for experts
and novices from other domains. It is possible that experts within
other, and non-academic, domains would consider knowledge
as more fixed and stable and therefore rate their own as well as
known knowledge higher than academic experts.
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